French Forces Jam Unknown Drones Over Nuclear Submarine Base Hosting Four Ballistic Missile Submarines
- MM24 News Desk
- 1 hour ago
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French forces responded Thursday night to unknown drones flying over a military base hosting nuclear-armed submarines on the Crozon Peninsula, jamming at least five aircraft according to a French official who confirmed to Axios that military personnel followed established protocols.
The base, Ile Logue, hosts four nuclear ballistic missile submarines: Le Triomphant, Le Temeraire, Le Vigilant, and Le Terrible. The incident follows five large drones spotted near Dublin Airport three days earlier along Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's flight path, with airspace closures in Belgium in November and Denmark, Norway, and Germany in September, according to Jens Holzapfel, business director at Nordic Air Defence.
French forces responded on Thursday night to unknown drones flying over a military base that hosts nuclear-armed submarines, a French official confirmed to Axios. The big picture: This is the latest in a string of mysterious incursions into high-security European airspace. The incidents have sparked suspicions of Russian hybrid warfare—but Moscow has not been directly implicated and little is known thus far about the incident in western France.
Driving the news: The French official told Axios that "overflights were detected above the Crozon Peninsula" on Thursday night. "The military personnel stationed on the peninsula and responsible for site protection responded promptly and appropriately, in full accordance with the procedures in force. An investigation is underway," the official said.
The official noted it is illegal to fly drones over military sites, and that the protocol in such circumstances is to jam the aircraft. Sources told AFP there were five drones spotted in total, and that no links to foreign actors have been established.
Three days earlier, five large drones were spotted near Dublin Airport along the flight path of the arriving Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, according to Irish media. The Irish Times reported that officials viewed it as a potential attempt to disrupt flights at the airport, rather than to attack Zelensky.
Drone sightings forced airspace closures in Belgium in November and Denmark, Norway and Germany in September. The Danish government referred to the drone activity there as a hybrid attack, but did not publicly point the finger at Russia. Reality check: Critical infrastructure—military bases, power stations, airports and more—are largely unprepared for today's drone threat. Stateside drone mania this time last year underscored just how fragmented policy, communications and countermeasures are.
The intrigue: These could be intentional intrusions designed to test response times and interception tech. They could be surveillance missions. Or they could be the carelessness of a hobbyist. But the French base at the center of this week's concern, Ile Logue, is home to four nuclear ballistic missile submarines: Le Triomphant, Le Temeraire, Le Vigilant and Le Terrible.
The bottom line: "It is naive to think that these drone incursions, now commonplace in the skies over Western Europe and wider NATO countries, will slow down any time soon," Jens Holzapfel, business director at Nordic Air Defence, told Axios.
"It is lucky that there so far haven't been more grave consequences."
The pattern of drone incidents across multiple NATO countries over recent months suggests either coordinated intelligence gathering operations or a disturbing lack of airspace security enforcement. The geographic spread—from Ireland to Denmark to France—indicates systematic probing of defenses rather than isolated incidents.
The Crozon Peninsula location proves particularly sensitive. The four nuclear ballistic missile submarines stationed at Ile Logue constitute France's strategic nuclear deterrent, part of its Force de Frappe. These submarines carry M51 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, representing France's assured second-strike capability—the ultimate guarantee of national sovereignty and security.
Surveillance of such facilities provides intelligence on submarine deployment patterns, security response procedures, base layout, sensor coverage gaps, and personnel movements. Even without capturing classified information directly, repeated overflights allow adversaries to map defenses and identify vulnerabilities for potential future exploitation.
The timing near Zelensky's Dublin arrival three days earlier raises additional concerns. Whether coincidence or coordination, the proximity suggests potential surveillance of high-value targets or disruption operations timed with sensitive diplomatic movements. Zelensky travels with extensive security precautions given ongoing Russian threats, making drone activity near his arrival path particularly alarming.
The jamming protocol mentioned by French officials represents standard counter-drone procedure—disrupting the radio frequencies drones use for control and navigation. However, jamming effectiveness varies depending on drone sophistication. Commercial quadcopters typically lose connection and return to launch point or land when jammed. Military-grade or modified drones may have anti-jam capabilities, GPS-independent navigation, or pre-programmed autonomous flight paths resistant to electronic countermeasures.
The Danish government's characterization of similar incidents as "hybrid attacks" without directly naming Russia reflects diplomatic caution while signaling suspicions. Hybrid warfare encompasses activities below the threshold of armed conflict—cyber attacks, disinformation, sabotage, and intelligence operations designed to probe, weaken, or destabilize adversaries without triggering Article 5 collective defense responses.
Holzapfel's observation about inadequate preparation for drone threats reflects broader defense challenges. Traditional air defense systems designed for aircraft and missiles often cannot effectively target small, slow-moving drones. Their radar cross-sections are minimal, flight profiles unpredictable, and costs trivial compared to interceptor munitions. This asymmetry—where $500 drones force responses costing thousands or millions—favors attackers.
The fragmented response capabilities Holzapfel mentions stem from jurisdictional complexity. Airspace authority typically rests with civil aviation regulators, while security services handle threats and military forces provide defense. Coordinating rapid responses across these entities during incidents proves challenging, especially when determining whether drones represent hobbyist mistakes, criminal activity, espionage, or attack precursors.
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